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Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care Act: Law and Process
Nicholas Bagley*
Helen Levy**
1. Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates a host of new programs, each of which
requires some kind of implementation at the agency level. By and large, the regulations
governing these new programs have been promulgated through relatively formal
notice-and-comment procedures and subjected to review coordinated by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). But the federal agencies implementing the
ACA have at times shied away from notice-and-comment rulemaking even where it
might have seemed appropriate. They have instead announced a number of critically
important policies through subregulatory guidance documents—a broad category that
encompasses bulletins, memoranda, and letters to state officials. These guidance
documents are typically published not in Federal Register notices, but on agency
websites.
This implementation strategy raises the question, a perennial in administrative
law, of whether the substitution of subregulatory guidance for notice-and-comment
rulemaking is a good thing. Does it reflect the zealous pursuit of good policy by
government officials reluctant to get bogged down in a ritualistic bureaucratic exercise?
Or does it represent an autocratic effort to avoid the rough-and-tumble of public
deliberation over the merits of particular rules?
We consider this question in the context of a case study. Beginning in 2014, the
ACA will require private insurance plans sold in the individual and small-group
markets to cover a roster of “essential health benefits.” Precisely which benefits should
count as essential, however, was left to the discretion of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). The matter was extraordinarily delicate. An expansive bundle
of mandatory services would assure comprehensive coverage, but it would also raise
the cost of insurance and could impede efforts to achieve near-universal coverage.
Whatever HHS eventually decided, its choice would “influence the nature of coverage
available to millions of people in the United States.”1
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In December 2011, HHS released its first official communication on essential
health benefits: a 13-page bulletin posted on its website stating that it would allow each
state to define essential benefits for itself by choosing a “benchmark” plan modeled on
existing plans in the state. The benefits included in that benchmark plan (subject to
some adjustments) would be considered essential within the state. On both substance
and procedure, the move was surprising. The benchmark approach departed from the
uniform, federal standard that the statute appears to anticipate and that many informed
observers expected HHS to adopt. And announcing the policy thorough an internet
bulletin arguably allowed HHS to sidestep orthodox administrative procedures,
including notice and comment, OIRA review, and preenforcement review in the
courts—notwithstanding the ACA’s command that HHS “provide notice and an
opportunity for public comment” on the definition of essential health benefits.2 By the
time HHS actually initiated a full-dress rulemaking process in November 2012, the
deadline for states to submit their proposed benchmark plans to the agency was almost
two months in the past.
What are we to make of this? The story of essential health benefits offers useful
insight into the merits of subregulatory guidance; it is also interesting in its own right,
both because of the importance of the policy question and the unexpected decision from
HHS. In this chapter, we explore two questions. First, is the benchmark approach a
lawful exercise of HHS’s authority under the ACA? Although we conclude that the
approach likely will (and, in our view, should) be upheld in the event of a challenge,
HHS may have brushed up against the limits of its discretionary authority. Second, did
HHS’s announcement of the benchmark approach through an internet bulletin allow
the agency to avoid the very administrative procedures that typically serve to constrain
the exercise of agency discretion? The answer here is a flat no. The agency’s adroit use
of guidance documents instead resulted in a process that was more open to public
scrutiny and external oversight than conventional rulemaking would have been.
2. Background.
a. What does the statute say about essential health benefits?
The ACA requires new health insurance plans in the individual and small-group
markets to cover a minimum set of services that the ACA terms “essential health
benefits” starting in 2014.3 This requirement applies to plans sold on state health
insurance exchanges and also to individual and small-group plans sold outside the

2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, §1302(b)(3) (2010)
[hereinafter “ACA”].

Large-group plans, such as those provided by large employers, are not required to provide essential
health benefits, although they are subject to a different set of requirements governing the actuarial value
of coverage.
3
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exchanges. The statute enumerates ten different categories of services that essential
health benefits must, at a minimum, include:4
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Ambulatory patient services.
Emergency services.
Hospitalization.
Maternity and newborn care.
Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health
treatment.
6. Prescription drugs.
7. Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices.
8. Laboratory services.
9. Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management.
10. Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.
Many of these inclusions are significant—for example, prescription drugs and
pediatric dental care might have been excluded had Congress taken a bare-bones
approach toward essential health benefits—but the list, by design, leaves much detail to
be specified by subsequent regulation. For example, does “habilitative services” include
behavioral treatment for autism, an expensive therapy with mixed evidence of
effectiveness?5 What do “preventive and wellness services” encompass beyond the ones
that another provision of the ACA requires all plans to cover without cost-sharing?6
Sensitive to the need for greater detail, the ACA instructs the Secretary of HHS to
flesh out the definition of essential health benefits. Specifically, the statute directs her to
“ensure that the scope of the essential health benefits . . . is equal to the scope of benefits
provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.” Congress
also instructed the Secretary of Labor to survey insurance plans “to determine the
benefits typically covered by employers” and report back to the Secretary of HHS.7 The
statute further directs that “[i]n defining the essential health benefits . . . and in revising
the benefits . . . the Secretary shall provide notice and an opportunity for public
comment.”8

4

ACA, §1302(b)(1).

See Brian Reichow, Overview of Meta-Analyses on Early Intensive Behavioral Intervention for Young Children
with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 42 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 512 (2012).
5

6

ACA, Sec. 1001, §2713.

7

ACA, §1302(b)(2)(A)

8

ACA, §1302(b)(3)
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In the normal course of regulatory events, HHS might have been expected to
launch an orderly rulemaking process not long after the ACA’s enactment. It’s hard to
say exactly what a reasonable timeframe for this might have been, but the ACA
required states to demonstrate to HHS by January 2013 that they would have health
insurance exchanges up and running the following year. That demonstration in turn
depended on states knowing well in advance about the scope of benefits that plans on
the exchanges would cover. Working backward, a notice of proposed rulemaking
would probably have had to issue by the end of 2011, followed by a final rule in mid2012, to have any hope of giving states the certainty they needed to create their
exchanges. That’s not, however, what happened.
b. The roles of the Institute of Medicine and the Department of Labor.
As its first move out of the gate, HHS turned to the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
for “advice on a process and considerations the Department needs to take into account
in its initial establishment of [essential health benefits] and in updating them over
time.”9 In other words, HHS asked IOM not to define essential benefits, but to offer
suggestions on how HHS might do so. The IOM report was expected to be complete in
the fall of 2011. This bought HHS time during which it might reasonably do nothing.
Assuming the agency was prepared to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking shortly
after the release of the IOM report, the formal rulemaking process could proceed on a
time frame that would allow for meaningful interaction with states and other interested
parties—including insurers, health care providers, and consumer advocacy groups—
before bumping into deadlines for health insurance exchanges.
IOM tackled its assignment with dispatch. It rapidly convened an expert panel to
write a report recommending methods for determining and updating essential benefits.
It also invited members of the public to submit comments online, and held two public
consensus conferences, one in Washington, DC in January 2011 and another in Costa
Mesa, California in March 2011. These consensus conferences featured presentations by
an impressive range of experts and stakeholders, and were summarized in a volume
released by IOM.10
Meanwhile, in April 2011, the Department of Labor (DOL) delivered its report on
employer-sponsored coverage to HHS.11 The report could offer little guidance on the
hard questions facing HHS because the DOL surveys on which the report was based
lacked sufficiently detailed information about the scope of coverage for specific
Sherry Glied, Testimony to the IOM Committee on the Determination of Essential Health Benefits, Jan. 13, 2011
(cited in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011)).

9

10

See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PERSPECTIVES ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: WORKSHOP REPORT (2011).

See SELECTED MEDICAL BENEFITS: A REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Apr. 15, 2011, http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/selmedbensreport.pdf.
11
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services. This was not entirely DOL’s fault: the “summary plan descriptions” that
employers provide their workers (and on which the DOL analysis was based) are
relatively sparse and uninformative. The report therefore gave HHS little to go on; it
certainly provided no useful guidance on whether, say, a “typical” employer plan
covered behavioral treatment for autism.
IOM did considerably better. On October 6, 2011, the expert panel released a 256page report recommending a method for determining essential benefits.12 Somewhat
controversially, the report proposed a “premium target” approach in which a single
national package of essential benefits would be tied to the cost of a typical benefits
package in the small group market. That national package would then be updated over
time to reflect innovation and public deliberation.
Following the release of the IOM report, HHS had little excuse for further delay.
The agency announced that it would hold a series of “listening sessions” around the
country. These sessions—two-hour meetings at which members of the public could
share their opinions with HHS officials—were conducted in each of ten HHS-defined
regions. The final listening session occurred in San Francisco on the Monday before
Thanksgiving, November 21, 2011. For the next three and a half weeks, HHS was silent
on the subject of essential health benefits.
c. The bulletin.
Then, on December 14, 2011, reports circulated that HHS intended to release a
“prerule” on essential health benefits, although the term “prerule” created confusion.
“Not even the most seasoned Washingtonians seem to know what it means,” according
to Politico.13 Two days later, the prerule was posted on HHS’s website with the title
“Essential Health Benefits Bulletin.”14
Although the medium may have created some confusion, the bulletin’s message
was both concise and surprising. Rather than specify a uniform national benefits
package, the bulletin proposed to allow states to choose a “benchmark plan” to define
essential health benefits. This approach was modeled on a policy introduced into
Medicaid by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Under the Medicaid version of the
benchmark approach, states were allowed to offer a modified set of benefits, linked to a
state-selected benchmark, to some groups of adult Medicaid enrollees. Only ten states

12

See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011).

13

J. Lester Feder & Jason Millman, Guidance by Any Other Name, POLITICO PRO, Dec. 15, 2011.

See Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, Department of Health and Human
Services, Essential Health Benefits Bulletin, Dec. 16, 2011,
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf
[hereinafter “EHB Bulletin”].

14
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have used this approach, and even then only for narrowly defined populations (e.g.,
individuals with diabetes).15
Adapting the benchmark approach for essential health benefits, the bulletin
proposed permitting each state to choose a “benchmark plan” from a menu of options,
including the three largest insurance plans in the state’s small-group market and the
three largest plans available to state employees.16 The default benchmark, for states that
failed to select one, would be the largest small-group plan in the state.17 Subject to
adjustments to assure their conformity with the ACA’s list of coverage requirements,
these benchmark plans would define essential benefits within the states.
The benchmark approach was front-page news, described by the New York Times
as a “major surprise.”18 As we explore in greater detail below, the ACA seems to have
been drafted with a single national definition of essential health benefits in mind, not a
different definition in each state. Most expert observers had not seriously considered a
state-specific benchmark prior to the bulletin. The Congressional Budget Office scored
the ACA on the assumption that HHS would establish a single, uniform standard.19
And the IOM report never mentioned the benchmark approach that the bulletin
ultimately proposed (although it did offer a limited endorsement for the idea that states
might deviate from the national definition of essential benefits, subject to approval by
HHS).20
Why did HHS take such an unanticipated approach to essential health benefits?
Politics certainly played a role. Instead of imposing a uniform federal mandate that
some states would inevitably dislike, the benchmark approach affords states greater
flexibility to tailor their essential health benefits package along the lines they think best.
What’s more—and although we lack the space here to thoroughly examine the
question—smart politics probably made for smart policy. Because most health
insurance plans “do not differ significantly in the range of services they cover” and
“generally cover health care services in virtually all of the 10 statutory categories,”21 no
state can select a threadbare benchmark plan that would thwart the ACA’s effort to
See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EXPLAINING HEALTH REFORM: BENEFITS AND COST-SHARING FOR ADULT
MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES (Aug. 2010).
15

16

See EHB Bulletin, at 9.

17

See EHB Bulletin, at 9.

18

Robert Pear, Health Care Law Will Let States Tailor Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A1.

See Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable
Care Act 8 (Mar. 2012) (noting that the bulletin upends CBO’s prior estimates of what would count as
essential health benefits), www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13Coverage%20Estimates.pdf.
19

20

See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 129 (2011).

21

EHB Bulletin, at 4.
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guarantee the availability of comprehensive coverage. And tying local benefits to local
market conditions probably results in less distortion (i.e. greater efficiency) than if
benefits were required to be uniform.
The benchmark approach does create winners and losers. Because of the way
premium subsidies and tax-sharing credits are calculated, recipients of subsidized
coverage in states with generous benefits will receive modestly more federal support
than those in less generous states. But that’s no different from dozens of other policies;
variation across states is simply a feature of our federal system. Even John Ball, the
chair of the IOM panel that would have keyed essential health benefits to a target
growth rate, offered only gentle criticism of the benchmark approach. “Given where the
department is coming from, giving flexibility to the states is a good thing,” he told
Politico. “But I do think they missed an opportunity to take a crack at getting costs
under control.”22
Leading Republicans reacted much more harshly—but not to the substance of the
policy. In a letter to HHS, a group of five influential Republican senators and
congressmen objected instead to the process of announcing it:
By issuing a “bulletin” rather than a proposed rule, the administration has
sidestepped the requirement to publish a cost-benefit analysis estimating
the impact these mandates will have on health insurance premiums and
the increased costs to the federal government. . . . [T]he administration is
not required to respond to comments received regarding this “bulletin.” . .
. The bulletin also does not have the force of law and cannot, therefore, be
considered an indication of what the proposed or final rule will decree.
Thus, states still have many unanswered questions and no more certainty
than they had before the “bulletin” was released. . . . It is unreasonable to
expect states to be ready to implement such draconian changes by 2014, if
the Administration is not even ready to issue a proposed rule on such an
integral part of the functioning of the law.23
d. From the bulletin to the notice of proposed rulemaking.
This gloomy assessment notwithstanding, the bulletin prompted many states to
launch their own administrative processes for selecting benchmark plans. And that was
the point: “By releasing the bulletin now,” the Secretary of HHS explained, “we’re
giving families, employers and states plenty of time to take this information into
account as they plan for the big improvements the health care law will make to the

22

Jason Millman, IOM Authors Fault HHS on Benefit Safeguards, POLITICO PRO, Dec. 21, 2011.

Letter from Michael B. Enzi, Orrin G. Hatch, Dave Camp, Fred Upton, & John Kline, U.S. Senators and
Representatives, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, HHS, Jan. 13, 2012.

23
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insurance market in 2014.”24 With just over a year to go before the January 2013
deadline for demonstrating readiness to run an exchange, and myriad other tasks to
complete, any state interested in running its own exchange could not really afford to
wait.
To be sure, some states boycotted the process, and some officials cited the lack of
adequate guidance from HHS on essential health benefits and other exchange-related
issues as one of their ostensible reasons for refusing to participate.25 In September 2012,
Michael Consedine, the Insurance Commissioner for the state of Pennsylvania, stated in
testimony before the Health Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee
that “[t]he lack of detailed information from HHS has put Pennsylvania, and many
other states, in a very difficult position. We are traveling down a road, directionless,
while knowing the road will end very soon—January 2014 is right around the bend.”26
Robert Bentley, the Republican Governor of Alabama, was even more pointed in a letter
sent a month later to the Secretary of HHS:
Your office released essential health benefits guidance on December 16,
2011, with the promise of more to come. It has yet to arrive. It has become
clear to me that the states have been left to decide the fate of their
insurance marketplaces with no additional guidance or regulations on
essential health benefits. This places governors and other leaders in the
untenable position of making a critical decision based on little more than
vague guidance and guesswork. . . . I decline to make a decision on the
essential health benefits benchmark plan. There is simply not enough
valid information available now to make an informed choice for such an
important decision.27
Ultimately, 22 states surmounted this uncertainty and, after undertaking their
own notice-and-comment processes, submitted their benchmark plans to HHS by the

Conference Call Briefing with Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius, White House
Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 16, 2011.

24

Other reasons that were widely cited by states that did not proceed with implementation included
uncertainty surrounding major legal challenges to the ACA (ultimately resolved by a Supreme Court
ruling in June 2012) and uncertainty about the possibility of outright repeal of the health reform law,
which has been more or less resolved by the outcome of the November 2012 elections.

25

Implementation of Health Ins. Exchanges & Related Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
H. Committee on Ways and Means, Sept. 12, 2012 (statement of Michael Consedine, Comm’r, Penn. Office of
the Comm’r, Dept. of Ins.).
26

Letter from Robert Bentley, Governor of Alabama, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of
Health & Human Services, Oct. 1, 2012,
http://governor.alabama.gov/pdfs/Letter_to_%20Sec_%20Sebelius_%20Oct_%2001_%2012.pdf.
27
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October 1, 2012 deadline.28 (Alabama and Pennsylvania were not among them.) A
slender majority of the states (26) held a public comment period on the subject of the
benchmark plan as part of the selection process.29 On November 26, 2012—twenty days
after the re-election of Barack Obama and not quite a year after the release of the
bulletin—HHS published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) on essential health benefits.30 The NPRM formally proposed the benchmark
approach that the bulletin had previewed. In its discussion of regulatory alternatives,
the NPRM noted that “HHS considered one national definition of [essential health
benefits] that would have applicable issuers offer a uniform list of benefits. However,
this approach would not allow for state flexibility and issuer innovation in benefit
design, would require a burdensome overhaul for issuers, and would disrupt the
market.”31 These two sentences represent the entirety of the NPRM’s discussion of the
policy wisdom of the benchmark approach.
3. Legality
Because the ACA does not explicitly contemplate a benchmark approach to
essential health benefits, the question immediately arises whether the approach is
consistent with statute. In other words, has the Secretary exceeded the bounds of her
discretionary authority?
HHS hasn’t yet offered a legal defense of the approach, but its argument will
probably run something like this: Congress delegated to the Secretary of HHS broad
authority to flesh out the meaning of “essential health benefits.” Under conventional
principles of Chevron deference, the Secretary’s interpretation of the statutory phrase
will be sustained (once a final rule has issued) so long as that interpretation offers a
reasonable construction of the ACA.32 Nothing in the statute precludes the Secretary
either from linking those benefits to state health plans or from giving the states the
flexibility to select benchmark plans. Given congressional silence on those points, the
Secretary’s exercise of her authority is fully consistent with the ACA.
The argument is a powerful one. There are, however, two ways in which the
benchmark approach is arguably difficult to square with the text of the ACA. The first is
Avalere Health. State Reform Insights. Updated October 1, 2012, at
https://www.politicopro.com/f/?f=11859&inb on January 11, 2013.

28

State Refor(u)m, Summary of state progress on essential benefits as of October 3, 2012,
www.statereforum.org. Some states, including Alabama, began the process of selecting a benchmark but
ultimately went with the default option rather than submit a choice to HHS.
29

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial
Value, and Accreditation; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,644 (Nov. 26, 2012).

30

31

77 Fed. Reg. at 70665.

32

See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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obvious. In a statute that is quite attentive to the division of regulatory labor between
the federal government and the states, the ACA repeatedly confirms that “the Secretary
shall define the essential health benefits.”33 This is not casual language: in three separate
places in the same statutory section, the Act contemplates that the Secretary would be
the one “defining” and then “revising” what counts as essential health benefits.34 The
ACA even instructs the Secretary to “ensure that the scope of essential health benefits . .
. is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical employer plan, as determined
by the Secretary.”35 The phrase “as determined by the Secretary” would do no work
unless it was the Secretary—not the states—doing the determining.36
Compelling as it may appear at first blush, however, this objection is not terribly
persuasive. As the NPRM clarifies, the Secretary has not delegated to the states any final
authority to define essential health benefits. Instead, the Secretary will choose a
benchmark plan for any state that doesn’t pick a benchmark or selects an inappropriate
benchmark.37 Nothing in the ACA prevents the Secretary from deferring to those states
that, in her judgment, select reasonable benchmark plans. That choice to defer is itself
an exercise of her delegated powers.
The second potential objection to the benchmark approach is both less obvious
and more substantial. Notwithstanding the Secretary’s wide discretion to define
essential health benefits, there are limits to the deference that courts will give to
agencies that interpret open-ended statutory language. As the D.C. Circuit has
explained, the notion that an agency interpretation is permissible just because the
statute in question “does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative
power (i.e. when the statute is not written in ‘thou shalt not’ terms), is both flatly
unfaithful to the principles of administrative law . . . and refuted by precedent.”38 The
question at all times is whether Congress intended to delegate to the agency the
authority to interpret the statute in the matter that it did.39 Where the agency’s
33

ACA, §1302(b)(1) (emphasis added).

34

ACA, §§1302(b)(2)(B), 1302(b)(3), 1302(b)(4).

35

ACA, §1302(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

The ACA also requires insurers to provide a succinct summary of benefits and a coverage explanation
to their customers. That summary must include a description not only of the ten categories that are
required to form part of the definition of EHB, but also of “other benefits, as identified by the Secretary.”
ACA, Sec. 1201, §2715(b)(3)(B)(i). This again suggests that the Secretary will determine the “other
benefits” that, together with the required categories, are considered essential.

36

37 See 77 Fed. Reg. 70,667 (noting that “if a state elects not to substantially enforce the standards outlined
in the final rule” for selecting a benchmark plan, “the Federal government will assume responsibility for
these standards”).
38

See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).

See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore
Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (“The whole idea of ‘agency’ is that the agent has a certain
39
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interpretation clashes with the statutory scheme or otherwise contradicts persuasive
evidence of congressional intent, the courts will not presume that Congress meant to
authorize the agency to so interpret the statute.40
As we’ve explained, the ACA was enacted on the assumption that HHS would
establish a nationally uniform slate of essential health benefits. Under the benchmark
approach, however, there will now be dozens of state-specific sets of essential health
benefits. Many provisions of the ACA are inscrutable, extraneous, or impossible to
implement in the face of that kind of variation. Consider again, for example, the
requirement that essential health benefits must be “equivalent to the scope of benefits
provided under a typical employer plan.”41 How could a variable roster of state-specific
essential health benefits be “equivalent” to the scope of benefits provided under “a”
(which is to say, one) employer plan?
Nowhere is the problem more apparent than in provisions governing state
coverage mandates. Some states require insurers to cover specific benefits—for
example, applied behavior analysis for autism or in vitro fertilization services—that
Congress anticipated would exceed what the Secretary deemed essential.42 Congress,
however, didn’t want to devote the tax credits and cost-sharing payments available on
the exchanges to the coverage of state-mandated benefits. The ACA therefore limits
exchange subsidies to defraying the costs of the benefits that the Secretary deems
essential.43 States must pick up the rest of the tab to assure that exchange plans with
extra state-mandated benefits remain affordable.44

authority, a zone of responsibility legislatively conferred upon it. … Faced with the exercise of such
authority, the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match, is to see that the ball stays
within the bounds of the playing field and that the game is played according to its rules.”); Matthew C.
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing that
Chevron “calls for a single inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s statutory interpretation”).
See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (holding that an agency interpretation was not owed
deference in part because it was a “poor fit” with the statute as a whole); California Independent System
Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (same).

40

41

ACA, §1302(b)(2)(A).

See ACA, §1311(d)(3)(B)(i) (authorizing a state with coverage requirement that exceed essential health
benefits to “require that a qualified health plan offered in such State offer benefits in addition to the
essential health benefits specified under section 1302(b)”).
42

43

ACA, Sec. 1401, §36B(b)(3)(D)(ii) (tax credits); ACA, §1402(c)(4) (cost-sharing payments).

See ACA, §1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) (“STATE MUST ASSUME COST.—A State shall make payments to or on behalf of
an individual eligible for the premium tax credit under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
and any cost-sharing reduction under section 1402 to defray the cost to the individual of any additional
benefits described in clause (i) which are not eligible for such credit or reduction under section
36B(b)(3)(D) of such Code and section 1402(c)(4).”).
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All this is unnecessary, however, if state benchmarks establish the essential
health benefits. A state benchmark plan will inevitably cover the treatments or services
that the state has mandated. As such, state coverage mandates are, by definition,
included in a state’s essential benefits. State coverage mandates can therefore never
exceed essential health benefits, and states with extensive coverage mandates will never
assume the additional costs that the ACA anticipates they will assume.45
The benchmark approach also raises questions about certain specialized
insurance plans that the ACA anticipates will be sold on the exchanges. For the most
significant example, the ACA instructs the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to
enter into contracts with health insurers to offer at least two multi-state plans on each
state exchange. Per the ACA, those plans must “offe[r] a benefits package that is
uniform in each State and consists of the essential [health] benefits.”46 Where essential
health benefits vary from state to state, however, a multi-state plan cannot both be
uniform and cover only the essential health benefits.47
In proposing regulations for multi-state plans, OPM recognized the problem. Its
solution was to read the “uniform in each State” language to require that “the benefits
for each [multi-state plan] must be uniform within a State, but not necessarily uniform
among States.”48 Taking the text of the uniformity provision by itself, that interpretation
is clumsy but potentially plausible. Subsequent provisions pertaining to multi-state
plans, however, suggest that Congress was worried about inter-state, not intra-state,
uniformity. Congress specified, for example, that nothing about the uniformity
See 77 Fed. Reg. 70,647 (“[W]e expect that there will be few, if any, payments made for state-required
benefits since required benefits enacted prior to December 31, 2011 will be part of EHB, and therefore will
not require the state to incur any costs.”). HHS apparently appreciates the problem, but its proposed
workaround is awkward. After a two-year “transition period” in which it will waive the requirement that
states defray any costs for coverage mandates, HHS will “evaluate the benchmark approach for the
calendar year 2016 and will develop an approach that may exclude some State benefit mandates from
inclusion in the State EHB package.” EHB Bulletin at 9-10. As we understand this statement (which is not
elaborated on in the notice of proposed rulemaking), HHS anticipates that states might have to defray the
costs for treatments and services that exceed some agency-determined baseline. In establishing that
baseline, however, HHS will of necessity have to establish a shadow federal benefits package that would
permit the allocation of state and federal financial responsibilities. That shadow package would not
precisely match a federal determination of which benefits count as essential because states would still be
free to select benchmark plans that covered fewer services than the shadow package. Nevertheless, the
act of establishing the shadow package would require the agency to confront the very question that its
benchmark approach purports to avoid: which benefits are so essential that the federal government ought
to subsidize them?
45

46

ACA, Sec. 10104(q), §1334(c)(1)(A).

Congress’ use of the phrase “consist of” is typically defined to mean “be made up or composed of,”
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (DEC. 2012), suggesting that Congress intended multi-state plans to
cover only the essential health benefits.
47

48

77 Fed. Reg. 72,589 (2012).
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command prevents a state from requiring a multi-state plan to cover state-mandated
benefits, so long as the state picks up the increased expense.49 There would have been
no need for Congress to bless that limited inroad on uniformity between the states if the
ACA required only uniformity within each state.50
In short, the benchmark approach to essential health benefits is a poor fit with a
number of provisions of the ACA. Although this raises the possibility of a credible legal
challenge to the benchmark approach, we think such a challenge likely would—and
should—fail. This is not a case where HHS has exploited statutory ambiguity in an
underhanded effort to intrude into regulatory domains that Congress never intended it

ACA, Sec. 10104(q), §1334(c)(2) (providing that “[n]othing in paragraph (1)(A) shall preclude a State
from requiring that benefits in addition to the essential health benefits required under such paragraph be
provided to enrollees of a multi-State qualified health plan offered in such State.”).

49

The benchmark approach also clashes with language establishing two other specialized insurance
plans. First, the ACA authorizes the sale of certain insurance plans on a nationwide basis, although
individual states can opt out and refuse to allow such plans to be sold in their states. ACA, §1333(b). Yet
an insurer can offer a nationwide plan only if its benefits package is “uniform” across the country and
covers the essential health benefits. ACA, §§1333(b)(3)(A) & (b)(6). This presents a tough question: must a
uniform nationwide plan written in, say, New Hampshire and sold elsewhere cover only the “essential
health benefits” in New Hampshire’s benchmark plan? Or must the nationwide plan cover any and all
benefits covered in any state’s benchmark plan? Neither option seems plausible. If the New Hampshire
benchmark could set the nationally uniform standard, insurers would have enormous incentives to
relocate their businesses to states with threadbare benchmark plans—just the sort of race to the bottom
that backers of the ACA sought to avoid in requiring uniform coverage of essential health benefits. See
David M. Herszenhorn, Let Health Insurance Cross State Lines, Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010
(reporting that “President Obama and leading Democrats, however, warn that without new regulations
[found in the ACA], private insurance companies would race to set up shop in states with lax regulation,
minimal benefits requirements and the fewest consumer protections”). And if the nationwide plan had to
cover every state-mandated benefit available anywhere in the country, Congress would have had no need
to provide that insurers must adhere only to those coverage mandates applicable in the state where the
nationwide plan “is written or issued.” ACA, §1333(b)(1)(B).
50

Second, the Community Health Insurance Option is to be a national, publicly operated insurance plan,
run by HHS and available on the exchanges, that will cover “only” essential health benefits. ACA,
§1323(b)(3)(A). Under HHS’s benchmark approach, the scope of coverage of this national plan would
necessarily have to vary from state to state. The ACA, however, is explicit about permissible sources of
state variation in the government-run insurance plan. Premiums can be geographically adjusted, states
can apply their own consumer protection and solvency requirements, and the Secretary can collaborate
with state officials to establish additional requirements and recommend policy. ACA, §§1323(b)(8), (d).
Another provision does contemplate some variability in state-to-state coverage, but only where states (at
their own expense) choose to mandate the coverage of benefits that exceed essential health benefits. ACA,
§§1323(b)(3)(B), (D). Because each state’s essential health benefits will already incorporate those benefit
mandates, however, the benchmark approach will countenance considerably more variability in coverage
than the ACA appears to contemplate—without imposing any additional burdens on the states with
extensive coverage mandates.
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to enter.51 The agency has just chosen to coordinate with states in defining a statutory
term that Congress gave it extensive latitude to define. Congress may not have
contemplated that HHS would adopt a benchmark approach, but so what? Agencies
routinely discharge their statutory obligations in ways that Congress doesn’t anticipate,
particularly in complex and fast-changing regulatory environments. Although the
benchmark approach may render some of the ACA’s provisions superfluous or
awkward, an agency’s choice is not usually deficient for that reason alone.52 Any agency
interpretation of a statutory provision almost inevitably makes other provisions of a
complex statute less significant than they would have been under an alternative
interpretation. The question remains whether the tension between statutory text and
agency interpretation is so acute that Congress could not have intended to allow the
agency to exercise its authority in the manner that it did.53 Given the wide scope of the
underlying delegation, it’s difficult to find anything like that degree of tension here.
Absent firmer indications that Congress intended to prohibit HHS from establishing
essential health benefits with reference to state benchmarks, the agency’s interpretation
probably will, and ought to be, upheld.
4. Procedure
Setting the legality of the controversial benchmark approach to one side, the fact
remains that HHS used subregulatory guidance—a 13-page bulletin posted on its
website—to announce it. The agency’s unconventional policymaking process raises
three concerns. First, in issuing the bulletin, HHS committed itself to the benchmark
approach without abiding by the notice-and-comment procedures mandated by the
APA.54 In a call with reporters on the day it issued the bulletin, HHS confirmed that
“[t]his is our intended regulatory approach” and rejected any suggestion that the
agency might depart from it.55 The formal notice-and-comment process currently
underway was launched after most states had already selected their benchmark plans
and promises to be even more of a charade than usual. Second, no executive order
See, e.g., American Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (invalidating an FTC
interpretation regulating attorneys as “financial institutions” because it was a “poor fit [with] the
statutory language”).

51

Cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 722 (1995) (upholding
EPA’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, notwithstanding that its interpretation, as the
dissenting justices argued, “makes superfluous (or inexplicable)” other provisions of the act).

52

See California Independent System Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding
an agency interpretation to be “a sufficiently poor fit with the apparent meaning of the statute that the
statute is not ambiguous on the very question before us”).

53

54

5 U.S.C. §553.

Conference Call Briefing with Assistant Secretary Sherry Glied of HHS, White House Briefing, FED.
NEWS SERV., Dec. 16, 2011 (stating “[n]o” in response to the question whether she anticipated, “based on
the comment that comes in [sic], that there’ll be either significant changes,” and confirming twice that
“[t]his is our intended regulatory approach”).
55
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required OIRA review of the bulletin, diminishing the accountability benefits that
presidential review might have afforded. And third, no court will review the bulletin
before the provisions mandating that insurers cover essential health benefits go into
effect, even though a rule adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking could have
been.
From this perspective, HHS’s procedural tack—a bulletin, followed by a long
wait and then a hurried notice-and-comment session—is the worst nightmare of those
who worry that agencies will use subregulatory guidance to avoid orthodox
administrative procedures and, at low cost and with relative ease, dictate to regulated
entities how they must order their affairs.56 This has not gone unnoticed: HHS’s
“atypical approach has been widely criticized.”57 Confronted with a spare 13-page
bulletin, states have been forced to select benchmark plans or cede to HHS the authority
to select such plans on their behalf. Private insurers are already crafting new insurance
products that comply with the state-selected benchmarks in anticipation of the January
1, 2014 date on which they must cover essential health benefits.
Looking a bit closer, however, what’s striking about the course of HHS’s
decision-making is that the agency has voluntarily replicated most of the substance of
the formal procedural requirements to which it was supposed to adhere.
Notice and comment. Before issuing its bulletin, HHS held a number of wellattended “listening sessions” where it sought views from states, insurers, providers,
and consumer representatives. And starting in April 2010, HHS made weekly calls to
state officials about implementation of the ACA, calls that informed its thinking about
essential health benefits.58 Around the same time, HHS also made it known to outside
groups that it was toying with the idea of delegating to states wide authority to
establish essential health benefits.59 Four months before the bulletin was issued, the
National Health Law Program (NHeLP) even submitted a lengthy letter to HHS on
behalf of about six dozen public-interest groups objecting to any sort of benchmark
approach. All this is in addition to the public discussion and comment process that IOM

See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992).
56

Amanda Cassidy, Health Policy Brief: Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Apr. 25, 2011), at
healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_68.pdf.

57

58

See 77 Fed. Reg. at 70,667.

Letter from National Health Law Program to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Aug. 25, 2011 (“Some officials from HHS have suggested that the Department is
considering giving states . . . significant discretion in defining the essential health benefits standard.”).
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carried out at HHS’s request60 and to the notice-and-comment processes that 26 states
used to select their benchmark plans.61
The agency didn’t have to do any of this. Without informing anyone of its
thinking, HHS could simply have issued a notice of proposed rulemaking announcing
its benchmark approach. After receiving comments and issuing a final rule, HHS would
then have complied with all of the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.
Paradoxically, however, formal compliance would have undermined HHS’s
effort to seek and receive meaningful public input on its proposed approach. Because
courts insist that agencies provide a fulsome explanation of the basis for their proposed
rules, HHS would have had to elaborate its benchmark approach in a lengthy notice of
considerable specificity.62 Having done so, the agency might not have been receptive to
comments suggesting that it abandon the benchmark approach in a final rule. The
agency could have discarded the benchmark approach in favor of a federally uniform
alternative only if it went through the laborious process of issuing a new notice of
proposed rulemaking.63 With statutory deadlines looming, however, the agency could
not have afforded the delay that restarting the notice-and-comment process would have
entailed.
Posting the bulletin was an ingenious way to solicit public comment without
irrevocably committing the agency to the benchmark approach. The bulletin was a trial
balloon—an effort to see if the approach would provoke the sort of public outcry or
incisive criticism that called for a dramatic change in thinking. When reports surfaced
just a week after the bulletin issued that “there was no backlash” to speak of, HHS
learned something valuable about the broad acceptability of its chosen approach.64
In addition, the bulletin’s very first sentence explicitly invited comments from
the public.65 The agency received more than 11,000 of them in response.66 Although
60

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011).

State Refor(u)m, Summary of state progress on essential benefits as of October 3, 2012,
www.statereforum.org.

61

See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1494 (1992) (“If the agency is to state
the detailed basis for its actions in such a way that its actions will survive judicial review, public input
through formal notice-and-comment rulemaking must come relatively close to the end of the agency’s
process, when the proposed rule has ‘jelled’ into something fairly close to its final form.”).
62

See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. MSHA, 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (final rule is
a “logical outgrowth” of proposed rule “only if interested parties should have anticipated that the change
was possible, and thus reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-andcomment period.”).
63

64

Jason Millman, First crack at essential benefits guidance draws no backlash, POLITICO, Dec. 18, 2011.

EHB Bulletin, at 1 (stating that its “purpose . . . is to provide information and solicit comments on the
regulatory approach” that it outlines.”).
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HHS has not made those comments public, the agency surely knows that they preview
the concerns that commentators will voice during the full-dress notice-and-comment
process—and that it will have to address those comments in issuing a final rule. If HHS
believed that the comments presented cause for serious concern, the informality of the
pre-notice process afforded the agency considerably more flexibility than notice-andcomment rulemaking to explore alternatives.
In short, at least from the perspective of meaningfully involving the public in
agency decision-making, the bulletin-followed-by-rulemaking approach has been far
superior to a routine process of APA notice-and-comment rulemaking. Significantly, it
cleared a route for the agency to receive public comment at the all-important pre-notice
phase of agency rulemaking. Commentators regularly lament that well-organized
groups with concentrated interests have better access than diffuse public-interest
groups to this pre-notice process where most important choices are made. The bulletin
served as a partial equalizer in announcing to those groups with less access to the
agency’s inner workings that the agency was open to hearing from them.
OIRA review. As it stands, no executive order currently requires agencies to clear
subregulatory guidance documents like the bulletin through OIRA. Late in his
administration, the second President Bush did issue an order subjecting guidance
documents to OIRA review67 out of concern that otherwise such documents “may not
receive the benefit of careful consideration accorded under the procedures for
regulatory development and review.”68 Although President Obama rescinded that
order shortly after taking office,69 a memorandum from his budget director clarified
that significant guidance documents remain subject to review.70 In practice, however,
review of guidance documents is unsystematic and spotty.71 Perhaps, then, HHS issued
its bulletin to avoid presidential meddling in its affairs even as it committed the
executive branch to the benchmark approach.
Yet it turns out that HHS did share its bulletin with White House officials.
OIRA’s website reports that it received the bulletin from HHS on December 14, 2011
and cleared it (with some revisions) two days later—the same day that HHS released
it.72 White House involvement likely ran deeper than this evidence indicates. Deciding
66

77 Fed. Reg. at 70,646.

67

Executive Order 13,422 (Jan. 18, 2007), at 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (2007).

68

72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).

69

Executive Order 13,497 (Jan. 30, 2009) (rescinding Executive Order 13,422).

Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget 1 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf.

70

71

See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation, 126 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013).

72

See OIRA, Historical Reports, at www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport.
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what counts as essential health benefits was perhaps the single most consequential
policy choice that HHS will make in connection with the implementation of President
Obama’s signal legislative achievement. As a matter of practical politics, HHS had no
choice but to vet the bulletin at the very highest levels of the White House. Even in the
absence of an executive order requiring centralized review, then, the bulletin received
just the sort of review that is supposed to enhance the legitimacy and rationality of
agency decision-making.
Judicial review. As it stands, HHS will likely issue a final rule on essential health
benefits only months before the January 1, 2014 date on which the ACA requires private
insurers (both on the exchange and off) to cover those benefits. In the meantime, a
judicial challenge to the bulletin is probably a non-starter. The bulletin may not count as
final agency action, and in any event it’s probably not ripe for review.73 That’s so even
though states, employers, and private insurers, anticipating that HHS will ultimately
adopt the benchmark approach, must take steps to implement the bulletin in
preparation for the 2014 deadline.
Contrast this with what would have happened if HHS had issued a proposed
rule instead of the bulletin. The agency could have finalized the rule sometime in 2012
or early 2013, giving affected interests an opportunity to raise an expedited preenforcement challenge to the final rule before it sprang into force. If one purpose of preenforcement review is to avoid forcing regulated interests to make “an immediate and
significant change in the . . . conduct of their affairs” that the law does not require them
to make,74 HHS’s unusual procedural tack has arguably thwarted that purpose.
There’s something to this—but not much. The benchmark approach embodied in
the bulletin will not evade pre-enforcement review altogether. At most, HHS’s decision
to outline its approach in a bulletin has allowed the agency to delay the date on which it
issues a final rule. Whenever that final rule issues, someone will probably bring a preenforcement challenge. Perhaps the plaintiff will be the mother of an autistic son who
can find no insurance plan in her state that covers needed services, but who believes
that, had the agency gone through the process of establishing a uniform federal
standard, HHS might have included such services in the package of essential health
benefits.75 Or perhaps it will be a California insurance company grousing that it must
cover acupuncture.76 The important point is that HHS knows that its final rule, when it
See Nina Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
411 (2007) (describing impediments to judicial review of agency guidance documents).

73

74

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 138, 140 (1987).

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (“The person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy.”).

75

See Phil Galewitz, States Moving Ahead on Defining “Essential” Health Insurance Benefits Under Federal Law,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Sept. 30, 2012 (“California . . . will require coverage of acupuncture.”).
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issues, will almost certainly be challenged. There is thus every reason to think that the
agency’s choice was disciplined by the near-certainty that the courts would one day
scrutinize that choice. From the agency’s perspective, the when of pre-enforcement
review is of less relevance than the whether.
Nor is it particularly worrisome that some states and insurers are taking
immediate steps to comply with the approach that HHS has outlined. Even in the
absence of final agency action, parties often structure their affairs in anticipation of
governmental action. Earlier pre-enforcement review might have avoided some sunk
costs—if the benchmark approach is invalidated, the efforts of states to select
benchmark plans and of insurers to fashion new insurance products will be wasted. But
steps made in anticipation of final agency action do not generally give rise to an
entitlement to judicial review. What’s more, even if HHS had issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking instead of a bulletin in December 2011, nothing would have
required it to finalize the rule promptly. The agency might still have waited until the
eleventh hour, devoting scarce resources to other pressing problems associated with
implementation of the ACA. Against this backdrop, the notion that HHS used the
bulletin to avoid judicial scrutiny is something of a stretch.
5. Conclusion
At first blush, HHS’s release of a terse bulletin to announce a major regulatory
decision looks unusual, even improper. It seems to reinforce the fear that agencies
routinely use subregulatory guidance documents to establish binding rules while
evading the procedural obstacles that might otherwise deter them from acting.77 And it
appears to confirm the wisdom of the consensus view in the academy that guidance
documents should be tolerated only grudgingly. Banning all guidance that effectively
binds the public may be imprudent—better that regulated entities have some inkling of
how agencies will carry out their duties than that they have none—but too much
guidance risks undermining the procedural regularity of the administrative state.78
Yet this consensus view rests on an unstated and rather unappealing vision of
administrative motivation. On this vision, agencies are staffed not by public officials
See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Law is made, without
notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register or the
Code of Federal Regulations.”); House Committee on Government Reform, Non-Binding Legal Effect of
Agency Guidance Documents, H. Rep. 106-1009, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (2000) (“[A]gencies have
sometimes improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory notice-andcomment requirements for agency rulemaking and establish new policy requirements.”).

77

See Nina Mendelson, supra note 73, at 413 (explaining that “scholars have generally reacted to agency
reliance on guidance documents with the guarded conclusion that this practice is better than nothing”);
Conor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 787
(2010) (noting the “common concern is that guidance documents allow agencies to make policy secretly
and unilaterally, undermining the legitimacy of the administrative process”).
78
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anxious to assure that their choices are workable and publicly legitimate, but instead by
a cadre of hardened bureaucrats bent on avoiding pesky procedures that slow them in
their efforts to impose their will on the public. Guidance documents are tempting to
those bureaucrats precisely because they allow them to avoid the sort of public input,
executive oversight, and judicial review that, by fostering accountability to a broader
public, could impede their efforts. (Or, to put it in terms more familiar to political
scientists, to the extent that administrative procedures allow political principals to
better control their agents,79 agencies will use guidance documents to exploit the slack
between them and those principals.)
Doubtless this accurately describes some agencies some of the time. But what
then should we make of the fact that HHS has used its subregulatory guidance to
replicate and reinforce—not avoid—the agency procedures that are supposed to assure
agency rationality and fidelity to law? It turns out that HHS is hardly alone in adopting
more administrative procedures than strictly necessary. In a recent book, Steven Croley
documents a series of important rulemakings from the late 1990s and early 2000s,
including EPA’s stringent regulation of ozone and particulate matter, FDA’s attempt to
regulate tobacco products, and the Forest Service’s efforts to curtail road building in
national forests. Although hardly a representative sampling, Croley’s examples “would
all unquestionably make a short list of some of the most significant regulatory activity
in more than a decade.”80 And in each and every case, the agency “provided more
notice, data, and opportunities for participation tha[n] the APA (or any other legal
authority) demanded.”81
In other words, there’s nothing especially unusual about what HHS has done
here. Far from ducking procedural obligations wherever possible, agencies sometimes
embrace them. Why? At least for salient policy questions of substantial importance—a
small but critical slice of agency action—agencies have a number of incentives having
little or nothing to do with formal legal requirements to solicit public input and assure
political oversight. Doing so provides the agencies with technical information, often
available only to private parties, about how to craft policies that are capable of
implementation. It arms them with scientific data that can help them better calibrate
their rules. It teaches them about the political acceptability—and hence long-term
sustainability—of the regulatory initiative. It identifies wellsprings of potential political
See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 243 (1987) (describing how “elected officials can design procedures . . . to mitigate [their]
informational disadvantages [and] to enfranchise important constituencies in the agency decisionmaking
processes”).
79

STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY
GOVERNMENT 160 (2008).
80

Id. at 258. Nina Mendelson has likewise identified a number of agencies that make a habit of soliciting
public input on guidance documents in the absence of legal compulsion to do so. See Mendelson, supra
note 73, at 425.
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support for the rulemaking. It lends legitimacy to the regulatory initiative by assuring
that all interested parties have had the opportunity to be heard both at the agency and
in the courts. And it eases the concerns of those concerned that the agency is regulating
by fiat. In sum, agency procedures can improve the workability and legitimacy of
agency rules while protecting them from judicial or political attack.82
If agencies often have powerful incentives to voluntarily adopt administrative
procedures, the reflexive distrust of agency guidance that runs like a leitmotif through
the administrative law literature seems misplaced. This is not to deny that agencies use
guidance to avoid the costs of burdensome procedural requirements. Of course they do.
That’s why issuing guidance is attractive to begin with. It doesn’t follow, however, that
agencies systematically use guidance to evade accountability. As the example of HHS’s
bulletin shows, sometimes guidance can enhance public responsiveness.
We don’t mean to make too much of one case study. Agencies do sometimes use
guidance to avoid scrutiny from Congress, the President, and the courts. But just how
often? An impressive study from Conor Raso has found no empirical support for the
assumption that agencies routinely use subregulatory guidance to avoid public
accountability.83 And, as a matter of first principles, that assumption seems no more
plausible that the alternative assumption that agencies are usually sincere about what
they use guidance for: to give regulated entities insight into the agency’s private
thinking, to shape how line officials carry out their duties, or even (as in the essential
health benefits example) to facilitate a public debate about the wisdom of a regulatory
approach.
Instead of assuming the venality of administrators, we might perhaps be better
off acknowledging a banal point: that the administrative state is a complicated place,
and that crude generalizations about bureaucratic behavior will often obscure more
than they reveal. Guidance documents sometimes allow agencies to evade public
accountability, but there’s no particular reason to think that’s inevitable or even all that
common. As with other forms of agency action, guidance is neither good nor bad, but
context makes it so. And when it comes to essential health benefits, context refutes the
contention that HHS hurriedly issued its bulletin in a brazen effort to sidestep Congress
and the President and shove an unlawful policy down the throats of the American
public. When you look a little closer, quite the opposite seems to be true.

See CROLEY, supra n.80, at 259 (“Ultimately, the agencies’ final decisions following robust
decisionmaking processes were then far less vulnerable to attack, whether by disgruntled interest groups,
legislators, or litigants.”).
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See Raso, supra n.78.
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